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Judging the Judge:

Billy Budd and

'Proof to Ml Sophistries"
Steven Mailloux

In The Failure of the Word, Richard Weisberg addressed the

most controversial question in the critical history of Melville's Billy

Budd: How should we judge Captain Vere's decision to hang the

Handsome Sailor?1 Weisberg develops his answer further in his paper
for this symposium, "Accepting the Inside Narrator's Challenge: Billy

Budd and the 'Legalistic' Reader." In both the book and the paper,
Weisberg quotes what he calls "the central passage" for understanding
Billy Budd. It reads in part: "Such events [as the Great Mutiny] cannot

be ignored, but there is a considerate way of historically treating
them."2 Weisberg claims that in this passage the narrator hopes "to
educate us on theories of communication," and he goes on to use one
such theory as the basis for his re-interpretation of Melville's story. In

the following response to Professor Weisberg's paper, I address his
two main points in using this theory of considerate communication:

first, I discuss the theory as part of his specific reading of Vere's
actions; and then I briefly examine the theory as part of a foundation
alist project for grounding literary and legal interpretation in general.

i

By "considerate" communication, Weisberg thinks that
Melville means communication characterized by covertness and
deception. For Melville, this covertness is sometimes necessary, as

when he suggests that certain truths can be told to unwilling readers
only "covertly, and by snatches."3 But in Billy Budd, such considerate

covertness is most often unnecessary and reprehensible, as in Clag
gart's dealings with Billy. Weisberg accuses Vere of this negative form
of considerate communication and argues that Melville wants us to see
through Vere's distortions and lies in condemning Billy in the court
scene. He goes on to show in great detail how Vere egregiously mis
reads military law, and he claims Vere does this intentionally in order
to justify7 hanging Billy. Weisberg argues further that there is a clear

motive for Vere's unjust and illegal act: by executing Billy Budd, a
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jealous Vere is symbolically killing Admiral Nelson, the national hero

Vere can never become.

I cannot examine here all the arguments Weisberg advances
for this surprising interpretation, but I do want to introduce my main
disagreement by mentioning at least a couple of my more local objec

tions. For example, Weisberg gives much weight to the surgeon's
reservations about Vere's behavior immediately before the trial scene.
Yet he ignores the way the narrator undercuts our opinion of the sur

geon in various places.4 Immediately after describing the surgeon's
doubts about Vere's sanity, the narrator observes that "with sanity and
insanity" to "draw the exact line of demarcation few will undertake"
and adds: "though for a fee becoming considerate some professional
experts will." The narrator then notes that the "surgeon professionally
and privately surmised" just this demarcation in Vere's case (102, my
emphasis). These comments and others raise questions about the reli
ability of one of Weisberg's key witnesses.

Weisberg goes on to claim that readers should notice Vere's
distortions of the law in his trial speech against Billy. But he fails to
mention the rhetorical fact that it was not the niceties of legal inter
pretation, distorted or not, that convinced the court members to con
demn Billy; it was Vere's straightforward appeal to their "instinct as
sea officers," their worry over "the practical consequences to disci
pline, considering the unconfirmed tone of the fleet at the time" if
there were not a "prompt infliction of the penalty" for the "violent
killing at sea of a superior in grade" (113, my emphasis). Rhetorical
effect, not interpretive deception, seems to be the point here.

I could continue this list of local objections to Weisberg's
interpretive argument, but I do not want to give the impression of

completely rejecting his negative evaluation of Vere's actions. I do
want to suggest that the reasons Weisberg gives for condemning those
actions are ? how should I put it? ? not well-considered.

ii

Not surprisingly, I have chosen a different passage than
Weisberg's as my central text for interpreting Billy Budd. This passage
appears in an earlier version of Chapter 7, where the narrator attempts
to "fill out the sketch" of Vere by describing the Captain's reading
habits. At one point in the late pencil stage of this passage, the manus
cript took this form: in his reading, Vere "found confirmation ... so
that as touching most fundamental topics there had got to be estab
lished in him some positive conviction, which he forefelt would abide
in him essentially unmodified proof to all sophistries" (313, emphasis

added). If "considerate communication" is Professor Weisberg's key
term, mine will turn out to be this phrase: "proof to all sophistries,"
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which I will use first to reread Weisberg's interpretation and then
center my own.
Weisberg bases his interpretive case on the equation of "con
siderate" with "covert" and "deceptive." But Melville's text gives us
several other usages not covered by this equation. Besides Weisberg's
key passage about "considerate ways of historically treating" mutinies,

we read how for a "fee becoming considerate" so-called experts will
draw the impossible boundary between sanity and insanity and how
the court members were "considering the tone of the fleet" in making
their decision. Earlier the narrator mentions that utilitarians "suggest
considerations" implying criticism of Nelson, and in Nelson's defense,
the narrator comments that "personal prudence, even when dictated
by quite other than selfish considerations, surely is no special virtue in

a military man" (57-58). In his trial speech condemning Billy, Vere
himself asks, "[I]s nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be con
sidered?" (110), and later charges the court to "consider the conse
quences" of clemency (112). And still later in a defense of the court's
actions, the narrator quotes an unnamed authority (probably Melville
himself) "with respect to other emergencies involving considerations
both practical and moral" (114). And, perhaps most ironically of all,
considering Weisberg's view of Vere as a considerate communicator,
we read that Vere seemed "unmindful" that his "remote allusions ...

were altogether alien" to his fellow officers. "But considerateness in
such matters is not easy to natures constituted like Captain Vere's" (63).
My point here is a simple one: the word "considerate" and its
variants do not just refer to covertness and deception in Melville's text.

Rather, the terms refer more broadly to taking into account ?
considering ? the many factors involved in any judgment, interpreta
tion, or argument. Considerations are the multiple, messy, even in
definable circumstances surrounding interpretive and rhetorical prac

tices (including interpretations as rhetorical practices). That is,
considerate communication involves adjustments to complex situa
tions, with many considerations, interpreted to an audience. Consider
ate communication deals with a multitude of considerations in trying
to convince readers and listeners.

Perhaps Vere does show himself to be a considerate com
municator, not because he deceives the court, as Weisberg suggests,
but because he convinces it. That is, Vere is a considerate communica
tor not because he covertly misrepresents the law but rather because
he explicitly and successfully appeals to the political considerations of
the case. However, at another level, Vere is not considerate at all. He
simply cannot cope with the multiple considerations in making judg
ments, interpretations, and arguments case by case. And here I arrive
at the center of my counter-interpretation of Vere's actions.
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Captain Vere does not make his case to execute Billy because
he wants to fulfill some kind of vendetta against Nelson, as Weisberg
would have it. Vere does so because he cannot deal with the threat of

political and intellectual chaos. Remember my key phrase: Vere
wanted to have "positive convictions" safe from "all sophistries." He
wanted absolute security invulnerable to the new and dangerous
arguments of the French Revolution. Here is the final version of my
key passage in the late pencil stage, the version that appears in all
published forms of the novel: in his reading, Vere "found confirma
tion ... which he had vainly sought in social converse, so that as
touching most fundamental topics, there had got to be established in
him some positive convictions which he forefelt would abide in him
essentially unmodified ... His settled convictions were as a dike
against those invading waters of novel opinion social, political, and
otherwise, which carried away as in a torrent no few minds in those
days" (62). Vere's was not to be one of those minds carried away by
such radical sophistry; his was not to be one of those overwhelmed by
alien considerations. What Vere wanted was a fixed point, principles,
foundations to stand upon to fight the impending chaos of sophistry,
of dangerous arguments.
Such foundations give Vere the neutral ground from which to
fight revolutionary ideas, or so he thinks. "While other members of
that aristocracy to which by birth he belonged were incensed at the
innovators mainly because their theories were inimical to the privi

leged classes, Captain Vere disinterestedly opposed them not alone
because they seemed to him insusceptible of embodiment in lasting
institutions, but at war with the peace of the world and the true wel
fare of mankind" (62-63, my emphasis). More pointedly, Melville had
written in an earlier manuscript stage that Captain Vere "disinterest
edly opposed the new theories not alone as impracticable but so far
partaking of the unsound as to border on the insane" (313).
If we return now to Vere's courtroom speech, we can see a
reason for his argument entirely ignored by Weisberg: "[a]fter scan
ning [the] faces [of the three court members] he stood less as muster
ing his thoughts for expression than as one inly deliberating how best
to put them to well-meaning men not intellectually mature, men with

whom it was necessary to demonstrate certain principles that were
axioms to himself (109).The narrator does not say that Vere wanted
to convince the court of Billy's guilt but rather that he wanted "to
demonstrate certain principles that were axioms to himself." He did
not want to "kill" Nelson by hanging Billy but to fight disorder, intel
lectual and political, by acting decisively to enforce and thus support

stable principles of actions. "Certain principles that were axioms to
himself" are the same as the "positive convictions" impregnable to
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"all sophistry," the "settled" principles which were "a dike against
those invading waters of novel opinion."

From this perspective, then, Billy Budd does not present a

conflict between good and evil, or between duty and compassion, or
even between law and justice. Rather it enacts the conflict between the
dangers of sophistry and the security of foundations: that perennial
conflict, if you will, between rhetoric and philosophy. What the story
and, in particular, Vere's dilemma demonstrate is that there is no sim
ple way of deciding which considerations matter; no general princi

ple, no rules, no theory applicable to all cases of interpreting and

arguing distinctions between sanity and insanity, guilt and innocence,
political duty and higher responsibility. In the messy world of inter

pretive and rhetorical practices, one can, as Vere does, fall back on
foundationalist thinking and try to avoid the potential dangers of
sophistic rhetoric, or one can hire a paid expert, like the lawyers and
doctors mentioned in the text, who will use sophistic rhetoric to argue
for or against, depending on who pays. Neither remedy deals with the

case at hand with all its considerations, Melville Seems to suggest.

Neither Vere's intellectual security nor the experts' greed offer legiti
mate motives for dealing with considerations of concrete historical
problems of interpreting, judging, and arguing.

m

In my rhetorical reading, the lesson of Bil
back, finally, upon the theories underlying any
text. Rhetorical (which is to say, political) consi
escaped in interpreting law or literature. Rheto
always historically specific, and thus general the
attempting to provide permanent foundations fo
never be effective except by accident. Professor
vides me with my illustrative case.
Weisberg presents his interpretation of Bill
general hermeneutics for reading literary texts,

"Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to
attempts to extend his theoretical claims to l
interpretation. In both cases, he aims to estab
theory for guaranteeing valid interpretations
paper he asks the question, "How is a text's g

approach to be gleaned?", and he answers that a

own "theory of interpretation." In Billy Budd

seen, a "theory of considerate communication,"

trial scene teaches us a methodology "to avoi
Weisberg adds the traditional objectivist exho
text in its fullness, avoiding no hint, embrac
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whose fullness? Which fullness? Weisberg could answer: the fullness
dictated by the text's own theory of interpretation. But don't we have
to interpret the text first to find the theory for interpreting the text?
Isn't this viciously circular? Moreover, I claim to have found a "theory"
in Billy Budd myself (one that looks suspiciously like the rhetorical
hermeneutics I have argued for elsewhere6), and my interpretation,
the theory I have "found," is very different from Weisberg's.

We seem to be left with the same situation with which we

started: we still need to interpret the text and argue our cases. Furth
ermore, no foundationalist appeal to "neutral principles" or "discipli
nary rules" outside the text will change this rhetorical situation.7 That
is, neither Weisberg's claims about a text's theory nor the more usual

foundationalist appeal to sanctioned rules provides an easy escape

from specific rhetorical contexts of interpretive argument. In every

case, the text or rules must be interpreted and the interpretation
defended. Along with Captain Vere, we may desire "certain principles"
that are "proof to all sophistries," but no hermeneutic theory will pro
vide them for us.
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